Iraq is torn by ethnic and religious strife

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At the end of 2024, the US announced the end of the international mission in Iraq and the withdrawal of troops from the country by September 2025. This closes the whole “American era” in the history of Iraq, which lasted 22 years, and now the country is left alone with its internal contradictions and the difficult legacy of Washington. In the article we will talk about the ethno-religious composition of Iraq, the background of conflicts between them and the main interest of external actors.

The impact of the US withdrawal on the balance of power

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with the participation of the United States, Iraq was transformed into a country that is a collection of ethno-confessional groups. Shiite Arabs became the most influential, accounting for about 60% of the population and their representative took the post of prime minister and actually became the leader of the country. Shiites live in key regions in the center and south of the country, including being the majority in Baghdad.

About 20-22% of the population are Kurds. They have autonomy in the north, with a degree of self-government close to quasi-sovereignty, and have their own president. At the same time, about 15% of the population are Sunni Arabs, who live primarily in northwestern Iraq. They hold the post of speaker of the country’s parliament (House of Representatives). Despite their relative weakness against the Shiites and Kurds, the Sunnis have a significant influence on the balance of power in Iraq. They were the most influential group during the reign of Saddam Hussein and suffered from his overthrow. But their influence has not weakened completely, as ISIS has shown in the past decade, and no one wants a repeat of such a scenario, because the opinion of the Sunnis is respected.

It is the balance of power between these groups, as well as the degree of influence of different groups within these communities, that determine the foreign and domestic policy of Iraq, ensuring the preservation of the integrity of an unstable state.

Against the background of the withdrawal of the US as the main external actor, the activity of other external players will increase. The most influential among them is Iran, which relies on religious anti-American Shiite groups. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which are seeking contacts with moderate Sunni and Shiite parties, will become stronger. Turkey will become more active, relying on Iraqi Azeris and Turkomans, and exploiting the Kurdish factor, regularly threatening intervention under the pretext of fighting radical Kurds like those from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In addition, China and Russia, which have strong investment capabilities and see the country as the cornerstone of Cold War 2.0 in the region, are playing an increasingly important role.

The ethnic and religious factor in Iraq’s recent history remains crucial to shaping the socio-political landscape. But the consensus between the forces is constantly shifting, which could have a major impact on Iraq’s future. In addition, a key factor in the status quo is the invasion of Western coalition troops led by the United States in 2003 and the subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. And also the participation of the Western coalition, primarily the US, in the formation of transitional power structures and revolutionary reform of the state system. The dominant position under Hussein was held by Sunnis. A policy of consistent marginalization and discrimination of Shiite interests was pursued. Under Hussein, attempts were made to build Iraqi identity on the platform of Arab nationalism with further manifestation of the religious factor.

Criticism of Saddam’s regime in the past has now evolved into criticism of the policy of appeasement of sects, religious movements and corruption of secular elites at the state level. Between 2003 and 2025, the problems were planned to be solved with the introduction of tools for inclusive government, developed among others by Iraqi Shiites who fled Hussein’s Iraq but did not leave political work. Under Hussein, posts and representation in government were distributed according to the size of ethnic communities. But the problem of forming groups along ethnic and religious lines could not be solved.

The developed solutions were temporary and solved the problem of overcoming the systemic crisis of statehood and stopping inter-ethnic violence. But since 2003, there has been a factor of consistent discrimination and marginalization of the Sunni minority due to the change of order in the country and initiation of politically motivated processes that appealed to the “crimes of the former regime” and the interaction of Sunnis with international terrorist organizations.

It was the Sunnis, offended by the new regime, who formed the backbone of the Islamic State in Iraq in the 2010s. It also included Hussein’s military armies, which were particularly aggrieved after the regime change and had claims to power against the background of the country’s crisis and its occupation by the U.S. army. It is worth bearing in mind the presence of a tribal and ethnic factor, where formal and informal leaders have influence both in the religious environment and on armed groups. This is projected onto the socio-political currents formed both to oppose the Western coalition and terrorists, and to implement their political program, which hides the interests of different nationalities seeking hegemony. And despite the motley nominal composition of parties and movements in the country’s parliament, they can be summarized into three main directions, which we will discuss below.

Shiites as kings of the “new Iraq”

Shiites are the largest ethno-religious group in Iraq. Among all Shiite parties and religious communities, two main groups can be distinguished: moderate secular Shiites, who share the principles of conventional civic patriotism (“technocrats”) and religious Shiites, oriented toward an alliance with Iran for reasons of Islamic solidarity. The “technocrats”, represented by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, are now in power, opposed by religious groups under the informal rule of Muqtada al-Sadr. The main area of Shiite settlement in Iraq is the area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers southeast of Baghdad and the border with Iran.

Shiites in Iraq
*Photo by Los Angeles Times*

The conditional dominance of the Shiites is due to the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime and, in part, to the US bet on the Shiites. At the same time, the Shiite community is not monolithic and capable of consolidated solutions. It includes forces with both nationalist and religious ambitions. The presence of contradictions within the community gives rise to alliances, including with the Sunni minority, for example, to solve electoral problems. The prolonged marginalization of Shiites has led to the squeezing out of some opinion leaders and public figures from “Hussein’s Iraq”, as well as the formation of Shiite socio-political organizations, including religious ones, parallel to the once de facto Sunni state. As Hussein’s concept of Arab nationalism failed, several subgroups within the Shi’ite community continued to organize, which resulted in their presence in a “free Iraq” and, with discrimination against Sunnis, allowed them to consolidate their position without the use of force provided by the United States.

The traditional influence on the Shiite community has neighboring Iran, which also hosted Iraqi Shiites during Hussein’s time, and which realizes its own foreign policy objectives in the region. After Hussein’s overthrow, Iran supported Shiite militias against the occupying Western forces, including Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) army, Kataib Hezbollah, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, all of which operate for Iran to this day. At the same time, the spiritual leader of the pro-Iranian Shiites, Muqtada al-Sadr, comes from the family of an influential religious figure and continues his father’s work to fight against the occupation of Iraq by the Western coalition. Thus, he called his supporters to armed struggle, which led to the formation of the Mahdi Army, which conducted its operations against armed forces, including the United States.

As the peace settlement progressed, the Sadrists, named after the leader, gained influence. In the 2021 elections for the Council of Representatives, their bloc came first in terms of seats. But due to controversies, they later gave up some seats, retaining the influence of the military wing.

The invasion of Iraq by ISIS provided Iran with a new opportunity to expand its influence. Thus, armed groups were organized into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which became part of the Iraqi army. In addition, the Iraqi government invited the pro-Iranian Al-Quds Force to participate in combat operations against IS terrorists. After the end of the active combat phase, the influence of the pro-Iranian Shiite militias was strengthened. The PMF is still in the Armed Forces and engages with Iran as a foreign policy player. It is Tehran that today is the arbiter of interaction between the Shiite political and military militias.

At the same time, Iran’s power is not unlimited. Individual groups have their own motives for armed struggle, which range from the now irrelevant confrontation with the Western occupiers and the Islamic State(IS) to the urgent tasks of containing internal terrorist threats and external aggression by the Wahhabis or Israel. In this light, the groups continue to be a power element of Shiite structures with their own religious organizations, political structures, including parties and their alliances, which are in conflict with each other.

So it is worth considering the presence of a corps of Western advisers and instructors, despite the “complicated relations” and the declared local confrontation. They were involved in building and training the security forces of a renewed Iraq. The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime is forcing the Iranians to reconsider their own strategies in the territories of both states. The conditions of the quota regime with the strengthening of the Shiite community since the time of Saddam Hussein do not allow the Islamic worldview of the Shiite parties to be fully realized. Therefore, most of the Shia political space is in search of preferential treatment and mimicry in the direction of “secular secularism”, which is also characteristic of the Sunni community. The strengthening of one force, such as the Sadrists, incentivizes the other players to coalition against the current majority. In this light, despite the dominance of the Shiites, the processes that are taking place among Sunnis and Kurds are of key importance for them.

Sunnis are humiliated but not defeated

The Sunni community was dominant during Saddam Hussein’s years in power, but was marginalized with US involvement, which was one of the reasons for the formation of ISIS. Nevertheless, the quota system has kept members of the Sunni community in political power, making them an important element of consensus within Iraq. They also retain the post of speaker of the Council of Representatives. Sunnis do not trust the Shiite majority, and informal armed groups play a significant role in this, because the plight has not led to a clear consolidation of the Sunni community.

The marginalization of Sunnis, which led to the formation of a new political elite in the 2005 elections, resulted in a significant part of the community boycotting the changes underway. Thus, the “internationally recognized” elections actually failed in Iraq in terms of the representativeness of the new administration. The quota system preserved the presence of political forces and positions in the cabinet of ministers for representatives of the Sunni community, but the former influence was no longer present. As a result, the once powerful clans no longer regulated the decision-making process in Baghdad. The continued marginalization of the Sunni population by the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who remains the “gray cardinal” to this day, and the radicalization of society against the backdrop of cheaper oil and the war in Syria led to the formation in 2014 of an alliance of Sunni armed groups called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Iraqi Prime Minister and Shiite Haider al-Abadi took up in 2014 not only the fight against ISIL, including with the involvement of the PMF, but also reforms in the country aimed at forming a government of technocrats to fight corruption and social division. The immediate instrument of the “government of technocrats” itself, which is also implemented by the current Prime Minister al-Sudani, is a continuation of Western methods to moderate the political situation in the Western coalition-controlled countries of the Middle East and Africa. But it does not solve the systemic problems, although it allows to overcome the division by building negotiation processes that result in the creation of “tactical political alliances” in Iraq.

This also allows for a policy of state intervention, primarily in the economy, which is important for Iraq in the field of oil production, where there are interests of neighboring Iran. And in this situation, it is especially important to promote in the Shiite community the idea of forming a unified civil nation on its basis, similar to Hussein’s project, but without his dictatorship and orientation on the Sunni minority. This is the most popular idea among Shiite and Sunni youth, who find it the most favorable. And increasingly, this conciliatory stance is being broadcast by the Sunni speaker of parliament, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who is seeking objective political advantage for himself. But the success of such tactics is still in doubt.

Kurds: an independent country within Iraq

Iraqi Kurdistan is located in northern Iraq and is divided into four provinces: Duhok, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. The capital is located in the city of Erbil. Iraqi Kurdistan has borders with Iran, Turkey and Syria. However, the oil-rich provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk, populated predominantly by Kurds, are not part of Iraqi Kurdistan and are disputed territories for Erbil and Baghdad. The president of Iraqi Kurdistan is Nechirvan Barzani. Iraqi Kurdistan has its own armed forces, the Peshmerga.

Throughout history, the Kurds have repeatedly revolted to create their own state – Kurdistan. On the territory of Iraq they fought the Ottoman rule, the British occupation, the Iraqi monarchy, and the Baghdad government. A treaty was signed between Mustafa Barzani and Saddam Hussein on March 11, 1970, recognizing the Kurds’ right to autonomy. But on March 11, 1974, Baghdad unilaterally proclaimed a law that did not suit the Kurds. Mustafa Barzani launched a new uprising, which ended in defeat and mass Kurdish migration to Iran.

In May 1976, the Kurdish armed struggle continued under the leadership of Jalal Talabani. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988), Iraqi Kurdistan became a battleground between the Iraqis on the one hand and the Iranians and the Iraqi Kurds they supported on the other. In the final phase of the war, Saddam Hussein undertook a “purge” of Iraqi Kurdistan known as the Anfal campaign. As a result of this operation, more than 180,000 Kurds were “enfalated” (annihilated), and another 700,000 were deported to special camps. The defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War (1991 – 1992) led to another uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan. By March 20, 1992, the Peshmerga controlled all of ethnic Kurdistan in Iraq. However, Hussein suppressed the uprising by April 3, leading to a mass exodus of Kurds to Iran. Facing a humanitarian catastrophe, the UN passed Resolution No. 688 on April 5, 1991, declaring the area north of the 36th parallel a “security zone.” By October, Saddam Hussein’s forces had completely abandoned these provinces. As a result, a virtually independent Kurdish state entity under the UN mandate – the so-called “Free Kurdistan” – emerged on the territory of the autonomy. On May 19, 1992, elections to the National Assembly were held in “Free Kurdistan”.

After gaining autonomy, the economic situation of “Free Kurdistan” was extremely difficult, because as part of Iraq it was subject to the general sanctions imposed by the UN against that country, and on the Arab Iraqi side it was blockaded by Saddam Hussein. From 1994 to 1998 there was a civil war between two main forces in Iraqi Kurdistan: Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), founded in 1975 by Jalal Talabani.

The KDP was supported by Iraq, Turkey, and until 1995 Iran, while the PUK was supported since 1995 by Iran and the United States. Peace was concluded on September 17, 1998 in Washington, D.C., facilitated by the entry into force of the UN Oil-for-Food Program, which required Kurdish leaders to cooperate in a mutually beneficial way to obtain the program’s funding. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds became active US allies, liberating Mosul and Kerkur. Later, under pressure from the Turks and Americans, the Peshmerga abandoned these provinces, but Iraqi Kurdistan consolidated its influence in these territories. In 2005, a new Iraqi constitution was adopted, guaranteeing the Kurds broad rights, up to the right to secede from Iraq in case the central government violates its obligations. Only a Kurd can be president of Iraq, according to the constitution.

The referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan was held on September 25, 2017 under tremendous pressure from Baghdad, as well as Iran, Turkey, the United States and other countries. More than 90% of those who participated in the referendum (the turnout was more than 70%) voted in favor of the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, but the Iraqi central government did not recognize the outcome of the referendum.

Currently, power, influence, and the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan itself are effectively divided between two forces: the KDP, which is controlled by the Barzani clan, and the PUK, which is controlled by the Talabani clan. The KDP speaks from conservative-liberal positions, while the PUK speaks from left-liberal positions. However, ideology here gives way to clan interests. The KDP controls Dahuk and Erbil, extending its influence to Mosul; while the PUK controls Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, with influence over Kirkuk. Currently, the PUK’s position looks more stable.

In 2021, conflict erupted in the PUK leadership between Bafel Talabani, son of the late party founder D. Talabani, and his cousin Lahur Jangi. The conflict shook the party until the October elections, when Bafel Talabani emerged victorious, forcing Jangi to quit. The PUK is now represented in power by Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid, elected to office in 2022. He succeeded his fellow party member, Barham Ahmed Saleh, who was also previously elected by the country’s parliament. This party continuity is related to the fact that the Shiite majority is wary of the strengthening of the KDP, which is close to the US and Turkey.

In opposition to the classic two-party system (KDP/PKK) was the Gorran Movement, which split from the PUK in 2009 under Mustafa Nawshirwan. The movement used anti-corruption rhetoric, denouncing both KDP and PUK leaders. It is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an all-Kurdish politico-military organization. Gorran is currently divided and does not play a significant role in Iraqi Kurdistan politics.

Turkey, facing problems with the Kurdish population on its territory, established cooperation with the KDP at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s. In the event of military aggression against Iraqi Kurdistan, especially against members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, these forces could become potential allies of Turkey.

In March 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hinted at the need for a ground operation against the PKK in the border area with Iraq. In October 2024, he met with Nechirvan Barzani, who arrived in Ankara on an official visit just four days before the start of long-delayed elections that ultimately failed again. Turkey has also shown interest in buying and transporting Kurdish oil, having previously done so 2012 to 2023.

Iran, with its considerable influence over the current government in Baghdad, is also interested in weakening Iraqi Kurdistan, which it views as an ally of the US and Israel. In this regard, Shiite groups linked to Iran regularly bombard the territory of Kurdistan, exerting military pressure on Erbil. And their media resources support Baghdad’s positions on Kurdistan’s autonomy and independence. Iran, like Turkey, faces problems related to the Kurdish population on its territory. Iranian Kurdistan, which borders Iraqi Kurdistan, has become one of the centers of protests in 2022-2023, and that is where the protests started from after the death of Mahsa Amini, who was Kurdish. Tehran claims that Iranian Kurds receive support from Iraq and periodically says its armed forces are ready for a ground operation. The US and Israel view the Iraqi Kurds as their strategic allies in the region. The Kurds remain the only force on which the US can rely. This fact causes active support for Kurdish groups in Syria, Iran and Iraq, which raises concerns among regional states that do not trust the Kurds. Iraqi Kurdistan has significant oil reserves, estimated at 45 billion barrels.

Under the Constitution, control over the trade of all Iraqi oil is exercised by the government in Baghdad, which provides Kurdistan with only 17% of its revenues. This situation creates economic difficulties for the Kurdish region, which seeks to sell its oil independently.

In July 2012, Turkey and the government of Iraqi Kurdistan concluded an agreement whereby Turkey committed to supply petroleum products in exchange for crude oil. This agreement proved to be favorable for both sides. But in March 2023, the International Chamber of Commerce ruled the agreement illegal and required Turkey to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion for unauthorized oil exports from Kurdistan between 2014 and 2018. As a result of this ruling, pumping of oil through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was halted and Turkey stopped direct purchases of Kurdish oil, contributing to an increase in the illegal smuggling of oil to Iran using tanker trucks.

As a consequence of these developments, financial flows to the region have been significantly reduced, which has had a negative impact on the living standards of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan. There are currently no agreements to resume oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey. On February 2, 2025, the Iraqi parliament approved a budget amendment plan that would increase payments to Baghdad to $16 per barrel for producing and transporting Kurdish oil, double the earlier proposal of $7.9 per barrel. The decision could be an important step toward the reopening of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. The region is also rich in other minerals such as coal, copper, gold, iron, limestone, marble and zinc. The world’s largest deposit of rock sulfur is located southwest of the city of Erbil.

Exactly for these resources will be the main battle: not only for resources of Kurdistan, but for the resources of the whole Iraq. Everyone is waiting for the US to leave. And the balance of power between these players, as well as between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds will determine the future of Iraq, which can either become a key country determining the future of the entire Middle East or remain an outsider and an object of foreign expansion.